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Abstract—In spite of the growing importance of software security and
the industry demand for more cyber security expertise in the workforce,
the effect of security education and experience on the ability to assess
complex software security problems has only been recently investigated.
As proxy for the full range of software security skills, we considered the
problem of assessing the severity of software vulnerabilities by means
of a structured analysis methodology widely used in industry (i.e. the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) v3), and designed a study
to compare how accurately individuals with background in information
technology but different professional experience and education in cyber
security are able to assess the severity of software vulnerabilities. Our
results provide some structural insights into the complex relationship
between education or experience of assessors and the quality of their
assessments. In particular we find that individual characteristics matter
more than professional experience or formal education; apparently it is
the combination of skills that one owns (including the actual knowledge
of the system under study), rather than the specialization or the years of
experience, to influence more the assessment quality. Similarly, we find
that the overall advantage given by professional expertise significantly
depends on the composition of the individual security skills as well as
on the available information.
1 INTRODUCTION
Given the raising importance of cyber security, several
Universities have recently introduced security courses and
degree programs [40], [49]. Some governments already iden-
tified key knowledge areas for their workforce (e.g. [32])
whilst professional organizations also proposed curricula
for Security IT management [22] and cyber security at
large [33]. However, the set of core skills is widely de-
bated with opinions often split between teaching adversar-
ial thinking or principles and abstractions [27], [12], [38].
Widely debated is also the role of governments through
public initiatives mandating academic training as a formal
requirement for recognized professionals [8], [36].
In this scenario, it is surprising that only few studies con-
sidered measuring the effectiveness of security education
and professional experience with respect to relevant security
tasks. Experiments to quantitatively evaluate the benefits
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of education and experience with respect to the ability to
tackle a cybersecurity problem have been mostly performed
by considering specific technical skills, often the ability to
write a secure code or to recognize programming errors.
In one of those studies [14], where the problem of finding
vulnerabilities in code was considered, no correlation be-
tween education and code analysis effectiveness was found
whilst a negative correlation emerged between the number
of vulnerabilities found and analysts’ years of experience
in security. An hypothesis to explain these results is that
complex relationships between professional knowledge and
problem solving are at work [17], [13].
Goal and methodology. Our long term objective is to
understand how different security education levels, profes-
sional experience, and personal skills affect the outcome of
software security activities. The latter involve a combination
of technical skills, system awareness, and management-level
perspectives, forming the set of attitudes (or “mindset”) [20]
that is often part of the job of information security profes-
sionals [46] or managers [11]. This is also reflected in best
practices for security education at large (e.g. the DHS table
of minimal content [32]). Part of the challenge is to identify a
task that is i) simple and structured enough to be amenable
to controlled experiments whilst being ii) rich enough to
provide a non obvious challenge to human participants to
the experiments, and iii) decomposable so that one could
probe different parts of the security skill sets.
We propose to use software vulnerability assessment as
a prima facie proxy to evaluate the interplay between dif-
ferent aspects of a security task: understanding the impact
of a software vulnerability on a system requires technical
and operational skills (e.g. to evaluate impact vectors), as
well as user-oriented and a management perspective (e.g. to
estimate user requirements on the attack, or consequences
of an attack). The choice of vulnerability assessment has
another significant advantage: it comes with a pre-defined,
world- standard evaluation framework that, for each of
these aspects, provides an objective reference frame: the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [28] 1. It is of
1. CVSS is the most employed software vulnerability evaluation
methodology in industry and government [35]. It is the result of
the joint work of national standard bodies, software manufacturers,
non-software companies, and Computer Emergency Response Teams
(CERTs).
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
06
54
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  2
0 A
ug
 20
18
2particular importance that its usage in corporate settings
is not targeted to software security specialists. It is a tool
that ‘general security practitioners’ with a CS background
should be able to operate. For instance, the User Interaction
(UI) metric only requires the assessor to comprehend how
the vulnerable software is used and in particular whether or
not a user’s action is required for the exploit to materialize;
the Attack Vector (AV) metric, instead, requires evaluating
aspects of the network stack of the vulnerable application.
Obviously, such task is only a part of the skills of a software
security experts. Security testing is another example of
activities and related skills. The DHS Curriculum provides a
good starting point for a list of such activities and skills set
[32]. However, as one cannot test all them at once (too many
confounding factors) we decided to focus on the assessment
task for this study.
To investigate the relation between skills and quality
of a software security task represented by a vulnerability
assessment, we conducted an experiment with three groups
of participants, asking them to score a set vulnerabilities fol-
lowing CVSS guidance. Our participants were both students
and professionals, the former divided between those with or
without specific security education, the latter with several
years of experience in the security field but no security
education at academic level.
Main contributions. A preliminary finding is that being
competent in security, through education or experience,
improves the ability to evaluate vulnerability severity. Al-
beit expected, the quantification of such improvement may
represent the basis for cost/benefit analyses (Eg whether
pursue a specialized but costly Master degree or a profes-
sional training).
Indeed, we found that experienced security profession-
als have no clear advantage over younger students with
a security specialization. Other experiments in different
fields have shown that expert performance is close to
that of novices when solving problems in novel situations
for which ‘precompiled’ rules are not helpful [41]. In an
other case, expertise reversal effect has been detected when
experienced learners decide to ignore novel but detailed
instructional procedures in favor of ‘I-know-better’ mental
schemes [23]. Hence, formal security education could pro-
duce a workforce able to compete with seasoned profession-
als when asked to perform well-formalized but relatively
new security tasks.
Whilst this result is encouraging, we believe that more
studies and tests are needed in order to establish evaluation
methodologies and metrics for advanced education and
professional training that often are considered as important
investments.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Information Security Education
Education is a recurrent topic in information security, often
related to the definition of guidelines for academic curricula
needed by a well-trained workforce or considered in field
studies comparing the performance of different groups of
professionals when faced to a security problem.
Relevant initiatives for the definition of curricula and
guidelines have been carried out by professional associa-
tions like ISACA [22] or ACM [27] as soon as cybersecurity
has been recognized as an emergent IT profession. The most
recent initiatives exhibit a remarkably improved maturity
of proposals. In particular, a joint initiative between ACM,
IEEE, AIS, and IFIP has produced a detailed framework for
cybersecurity curriculum encompassing several knowledge
areas [33]. The NSA, instead, together with the Department
of Homeland Security, has been supported for years some
Centers of Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense (CAE-CD)
and, in connection with that initiative, the definition of a list
of cybersecurity Knowledge Units (KUs) to be mapped on
specific topics included into academic curricula [32]. With
respect to the content of a cybersecurity curriculum, both
the Joint Task Force and the CAE-CD propose a broad spec-
trum of competences, including technical and non-technical
KUs (i.e., CAE-CD), or human, organisational, and societal
security knowledge areas in addition to the more traditional
system, data, software, component, and connection areas
(i.e. the Joint Task Force). Other analyses have further con-
tributed to the discussion [40], [26], [49], [38].
Relative to the professionalization of cybersecurity, some
have discussed the difficulty that professionals have to agree
on a set of well-established characteristics and the need
for the cybersecurity profession to evolve [8], [36], [12].
These analyses are connected to our work because they
reflect the lack of experimental studies on the effectiveness
of security education and security experience, and on the
emerging scenario composed by many security profiles and
professions.
Several works obtained results from controlled exper-
iments with students and professionals performing secu-
rity tasks, although almost all of them focused on spe-
cific skills or even specific tools. In [47], a sample of de-
velopers recruited from GitHub was asked to complete
simple security programming tasks. It turns out that the
only statistically significant difference was determined by
the years of programming experience, which indicates that
familiarity with the task is the main driver, rather than
professional or educational level. This is in line with results
in [14], whereby security professionals do not outperform
students in identifying security vulnerabilities. The usability
of cryptographic libraries has been studied in [2]. Relevant
for our work is the fact that different groups of individuals,
with different levels of education or experience, have been
recruited. They found that the participants programming
skill, security background, and experience with the given
library did not significantly predict the code’s overall func-
tionality. Instead, participants with security skills produced
more secure software, although neither as good as expected
nor as self-evaluated by participants. We have found com-
patible results, although under very different settings and
more nuanced. All these works differ from ours in studying
the performance of individuals with respect to a specific
technical security skill or tool rather than studying how ed-
ucation, experience, and the combination of skills correlate
with more general security problem solving performances.
The one closer to us is [3], where Android developers’
decision making performance are also analyzed with respect
to education and experience. The experiment was based on
observing how developers with different background per-
form when provided with different types of documentation
3and it found a sensible difference between professionals and
students. However, with respect to our work, the analysis
based on the different backgrounds was limited and only a
minor part of the study.
In other research fields, namely human-computer inter-
action and software engineering, there has been an ample
discussion on the accuracy and precision of problem solving
by different types of evaluation panels. Some studies have
since long investigated the factors that distinguish experts
from novices [44] or in evaluating software usability [18],
[24]. In general, what studies in different fields have demon-
strated is that, under specific circumstances, experts not nec-
essarily perform better than novices in technical tasks, and
that the relation between knowledge and problem solving
ability is often unclear. These observations further motivate
a specific investigation for security problems.
2.2 Vulnerability assessment
Vulnerability assessment represents a fundamental phase
for security risk analysis and the prioritization of activities.
In this regards, it is both a technical task and a security
management issue, which includes the adoption of a struc-
tured analysis methodology supporting a metric for assign-
ing a qualitative or quantitative evaluation to vulnerabilities
and the availability of assessors with adequate skills and
training [20], [35], [9]. Vulnerability distributions have been
studied
Related to our work, some research analyzed the distri-
bution of vulnerability assessments performed by means of
the CVSS [39], [25], [16]. Similarly, [5], [7], [6] investigated
whether vulnerabilities with a high CVSS score corresponds
to an equally high risk of exploitation in the wild.
Some studies have considered the difference in vulner-
ability scoring produced by assessors with different pro-
files [19], [20]. Differently from these works, we aim at
studying to what extent security education and practical
experience influence the outcome of a vulnerability assess-
ment.
3 STUDY DESIGN
3.1 Analysis goals and research questions
In this study we evaluate the effect of different subject
characteristics on technical, user and system-oriented, and man-
agerial aspects of a security task. Specifically, our study aims
at the following two goals:
Goal 1: Effect of security knowledge
We first evaluate the effect of skills in security on the
accuracy of an assessment. We distinguish between skills ac-
quired through formal security education, meaning academic-
level specialized security courses, and through professional
experience, as years of work in the security field. We formu-
late two research questions:
RQ1.1: Does formal security education have a posi-
tive impact on the accuracy of a structured security
assessment?
RQ1.2: Does professional expertise systematically
improve assessment accuracy over formal security
education?
Goal 2: Effect of specific security competences
The second aspect we want to investigate is how specific
skills impact the accuracy of the security assessment. Our
underlying hypothesis here is that the analysis should con-
sider the specific mix of competences, derived from educa-
tion and professional experience, in order to identify mean-
ingful relations between education/experience and problem
solving ability in security. The provision of a ‘standardized’
portfolio of security competences has been pushed by both
academic curricula [27] and industry [45], yet it is unclear
whether this fits well the requirements of a real world
scenario. This research goal addresses the following research
questions:
RQ2.1: Does the mix of competences affect the
overall accuracy of an assessment?
RQ2.2: Which specific aspects of a security assess-
ment are more influenced by which specific skill?
3.2 Task mapping and vulnerability selection
The CVSS v3 framework provides a natural mapping of
different vulnerability metrics on aspects of the larger spec-
trum of security competencies we are considering: technical,
user-oriented, and management-oriented. Using CVSS, the
assessor performs an evaluation of the vulnerability based
on available information.
Table 1 provides a summary of CVSS’s Base metrics used
in this study, their possible values, and their relation with
the three competency levels we identify.
To guarantee the vulnerabilities’ representativeness the
wider set of vulnerability characteristics, we chose the vul-
nerabilities for our experiment by randomly sampling thirty
vulnerabilities from the one hundred used by the CVSS
Special Interest Group (SIG) to define the CVSS standard.
This also assures that the sample is representative of the
distribution of CVSS vulnerability measures in the popula-
tion of vulnerabilities (which are not uniformly distributed,
see for example [39], [6]). The vulnerability descriptions are
taken from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), the
reference dataset of disclosed software vulnerabilities.
3.3 Participants and recruiting procedure
We follow [29] and performed a natural experiment recruit-
ing three groups of individuals (total n = 73 participants):
35 major students with no training in security; 19 major
students with three to four years of specific training in
security; 19 security professionals with several years of
experience. Some participants knew what CVSS is used for
and its scores associated to CVE vulnerabilities, but none
had experience with CVSSv3 vulnerability assessment or
knew the specific metrics used to produce the score.
The experiment has been organized by replicating the
procedure performed by the CVSS Special Interest Group
(SIG) for its own operations by asking each participant to
complete 30 vulnerability assessments in 90 minutes by
using only the CVE vulnerability description as the only
technical information available. The official assessments
produced by the CVSS SIG were used as our benchmark
to compare between-group performance.
Unfortunately, recruiting subjects with very different
profiles makes it hard to control for possible confoundings;
4TABLE 1
Summary of considered CVSS v3 Base metrics and mapping to competency levels.
CVSS Metric Metric desc. Values Skill set
AV Attack Vector Reflects how remote the at-
tacker can be to deliver the at-
tack against the vulnerable com-
ponent. The more remote, the
higher the score.
Physical,
Local,
Adjacent
Net.,
Network.
The assessor understands the
technical causes and vectors of attack
related to a software vulnerability.
This encompasses knowledge of
vulnerable configurations, local and
remote attack delivery, and aspects
related to attack engineering.
AC Attack Complexity Reflects the existence of condi-
tions that are beyond the at-
tacker’s control for the attack to
be successful.
High,
Low.
PR Privileges
Required
Reflects the privileges the at-
tacker need have on the vulnera-
ble system to exploit the vulner-
able component.
High,
Low,
None.
The assessor understands the
interaction between the vulnerable
system, the user, and the attack. For
example, attacks against
administrative users may require
specific attack techniques (e.g.
spear-phishing); similarly, user
behaviour may affect the outcome of a
security problem (e.g. ignoring alert
dialogues).
UI User Interaction Reflects the need for user in-
teraction to deliver a successful
attack.
Required,
None.
C Conf. Measures the impact to the con-
fidentiality of information on
the impacted system.
None,
Low,
High.
The assessors can evaluate the
repercussions of a security problem
over business-level aspects such as
data exfiltration and system
performance.
I Integrity Measures the impact to the in-
tegrity of information stored on
the impacted system.
None,
Low,
High.
A Availability Measures the impact to the
availability of the impacted
component.
None,
Low,
High.
for example, some professionals may have received an ed-
ucation equivalent to that of (a group of) student subjects,
or some students may have changed masters during their
student career. As these effects are impossible to reliably
measure, we explicitly account for the (unmeasured) in-
subject variability in the analysis methodology and report
the corresponding estimates.
3.3.1 Students
Students participating in our study are MSc students of
two European Universities, both requiring proficiency in
English and a background in computer science. The first
group, SEC, is enrolled in the Information Security MSc of
the University of Milanthat completes a BSc in Information
Security held at the same university. The second group,
CS group, is composed of students enrolled in a Computer
Science MSc at the University of Trento, Italy. SEC subjects
were recruited during the Risk Analysis and Management
course at the first year of their MSc; CS students were
recruited during the initial classes of the course Security and
Risk Management, the first security-specific course available
in their MSc curriculum.
Table 2 reports students skills as core knowledge units
(taken from the U.S. Center for Academic Excellence (CAE)
Core Knowledge Units in Cyber-security) of respective
BSc programs. In particular, we see that they share some
core Computer Science competences, whereas only the SEC
group has been trained on core Information Security com-
petences.
3.3.2 Professionals
Subjects in the PRO group are members of a professional
security community lead by representatives of the Italian
headquarters of a major US corporation in the IT sector.
Participants in our study have been recruited through the
advertisement in the Community’s programme of a training
course on CVSS v3. Participants in the PRO group have
different seniority in security and all professional profiles
focus on security-oriented problems, technologies, and reg-
ulations.
To characterize PRO experiences, we asked them to com-
plete a questionnaire detailing job classification and years of
experience, education level, experience in vulnerability as-
sessment, and expertise level in system security/hardening,
network security, cryptography, and attack techniques. Of
the 19 components of the PRO group, 13 completed the
questionnaire. The median subject in the PRO group has six
years of expertise in the security field, and roles comprise
Security Analysts, CERT members, Pentesters and IT audi-
tors. A detailed characterization of PRO subjects over the
other dimensions is given in Sec. 4.2.
3.4 Data collection
Ahead of the experiment, participants attended an introduc-
tory seminar to CVSS v3 held by one of the authors with
several years of expertise on CVSS. Content and delivery
of the seminar have been identical for the three groups.
After that, participants were given a printed sheet in tabular
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Core Knowledge Units for CS and SEC students
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TABLE 3
Example of assessment by one randomly selected participant for each
CS, SEC, PRO groups compared to SIG’s evaluation for CVE 2010-3974
Excerpt of the CVE 2010-3974: fxscover.exe in the Fax Cover Page Editor
in Microsoft Windows XP SP2 and SP3, Windows Server 2003 SP2,
Windows Vista SP1 and SP2, Windows Server 2008 Gold, SP2, R2, and
R2 SP1, and Windows 7 Gold and SP1 does not properly parse FAX cover
pages, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted
.cov file, aka “Fax Cover Page Editor Memory Corruption Vulnerability”.
CVSS assessment
Participant
in group:
AV AC PR UI C I A Confident
CS N H L N L L L Yes
SEC L L L R H H H Unsure
PRO L L N N H H H Yes
SIG L L N R H H H -
form reporting vulnerability description, CVSS metrics, and
requesting an evaluation on the confidence in the assess-
ment. All participants had at hand a summary description
of CVSS v3 metrics obtained from the First.org’s website
for reference during the exercise. Time for completing the
test was 90 minutes, chosen on the basis of previous pilot
studies. All participants completed the assessment in the
assigned time with the exception of seven students in the CS
group. All experiment material is provided for consultation
at https://github.com/cvssexp/cvssmaterial.
Table 3 reports an example of vulnerability assessment.
The answers from one participant, randomly chosen, for
each group, are shown together with reference evaluations
produced by SIG (bottom row). In this particular case,
the CS student had all answers wrong and, despite this,
declared to be confident in his/her evaluation. Both the
SEC student and the PRO professional, instead, made one
mistake, but exhibited different degree of confidence in their
evaluation.
3.5 Analysis methodology
We formalize a CVSS assessment by assuming there exists
a function ai(vj) representing the assessment produced by
assessor i ∈ {CS∪SEC∪PRO} of vulnerability v represented
as the vector of CVSS metrics to be evaluated (j ∈ {AV, AC,
UI, PR, C, I, A}). We further define a function e(ai(vj)) that
detects the error on metric j by assessor i on vulnerability
v by comparing the subject’s assessment ai∈{CS,SEC,PRO}(vj)
with the assessment provided by the SIG as∈SIG(vj) on the
same vulnerability.
We observe subjects in our study multiple times (once
per vulnerability). As each observation is not independent
and subjects may learn or understand each vulnerability dif-
ferently, a formal analysis of our data requires to account for
the variance in the observation caused by subject (e.g. rate of
learning or pre-existent knowledge) and vulnerability char-
acteristics (e.g. clarity of description). To evaluate the effect
rigorously, we adopt a set of mixed-effect regression models
that account for two sources of variation: the vulnerability;
and the subject [4]. The general form of the models is
g(yjiv) = xivβ + ziui + hvkv + iv, (1)
where g(·) is the link function, and yjiv denotes the ob-
servation on CVSS metric j performed by subject i on
vulnerability v. xivj is the vector of fixed effects with
coefficient β. The vectors ui and kv capture the shared vari-
ability at the subject and vulnerability levels that induces
the association between responses (i.e. assessment error on
CVSS metric j) within each observation level (i.e. subject
i and vulnerability v). iv is the leftover error. We report
regression results alongside a pseudo-R2 estimation of the
explanatory power of the model for the fixed-effect part as
well as for the full model as specified in [30]. We report odds
ratio (exponentiated regression coefficients) and confidence
intervals (via robust profile-likelihood estimations [43]) for
a more immediate model interpretation. Odds lower than
one (with 0 ≤ C.I. < 1) indicate a significant decrease in
error rates. These are indicated in Table 6, 7 with a ∗ next
to the estimate. Borderline results are those whose C.I. only
marginally crosses the unity up to 5% (i.e. 0 ≤ C.I. ≤ 1.05).
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our data collection comprises 2190 assessments performed
by 73 subjects over 30 vulnerabilities. We consider an as-
sessment as valid if the assessment is a) complete (i.e., the
whole CVSS vector is compiled), and b) meaningful (i.e.
the assessment is made by assigning a valid value to each
CVSS metrics). This leaves us with 1924 assessments for our
analysis, or ≈ 88% valid records.
6TABLE 4
Confidence assessments for the groups
Confident
Group Yes No Unsure tot.
CS 228 552 82 862
SEC 275 203 57 535
PRO 254 167 106 527
tot. 757 922 245 1924
4.1 Effect of security knowledge
4.1.1 Assessment confidence
We start our analysis by evaluating the level of scoring
confidence for the three groups for each vulnerability. Ta-
ble 4 shows the results for the subjects’ reported confidence
in the assessments. Overall, subjects declared to have been
confident in their assessment in 39% (757) of the cases, and
non-confident in 48% (922). For the remaining 13%, subjects
were unsure. Looking at the different groups, a significant
majority of scorings in the CS group (64%) was rated as low
confidence, while for SEC and PRO groups approximately
50% were confident assessments. Even by considering ‘Un-
sure’ assessments as low confidence, the figures for the SEC
and PRO groups are statistically indistinguishable (p = 1
for a Fisher exact test2), whereas the difference is significant
between CS and SEC+PRO confidence levels (p = 0.017).
4.1.2 Severity estimations
Whereas technical details may significantly vary between
vulnerabilities, for simplicity we grouped the vulnerabil-
ity assessed into six macro-categories whose definitions
have been derived from the Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE)3:
• input: vulnerabilities caused by flawed or missing
validation (e.g. code injection);
• information: vulnerabilities regarding system or
process specific (e.g. info disclosure);
• resource access: vulnerabilities granting the at-
tacker access to otherwise unauthorized resources
(e.g. path traversal);
• crypto: vulnerabilities affecting cryptographic pro-
tocols or systems;
• other: vulnerabilities that do not belong to specific
CWE classes (taken as is from NVD);
• insufficient information: vulnerabilities for
which there is not enough information to provide a
classification (taken as is from NVD).
Figure 1 reports how severity estimations of vulner-
abilities vary, w.r.t. the reference score computed by the
SIG, between the three groups of participants and for each
vulnerability category. A positive difference indicates an
overestimation (i.e. participants attributed a higher severity
score); a negative value indicates an underestimation. We ob-
serve that Cryptographic Issues and Insufficient
2. To avoid issues with dependent observations, we compute the rate
of ”Yes”, ”No”, ”Maybe” answers for each subject, and consider the
highest rate to match the subject to a category.
3. Details at: http://cwe.mitre.org, last visited April 2018.
information categories were perceived as more severe by
all participant groups than by the SIG, whereas for other
categories the results are mixed. Following NIST guidelines,
and over- or under-estimation of two points may result in an
important mis-categorization of the vulnerability, whereas
an error of ±0.5 points is within accepted tolerance lev-
els [1]. Overall, we find that experiment subjects’ estima-
tions of vulnerability severity are only marginally off with
respect to the SIG estimations.
4.1.3 Assessment errors
In Figure 2 we have a more detailed inspection of scoring
errors for the three groups by considering the specific CVSS
metrics rather than the total score as computed by the CVSS
for a vulnerability. We first evaluate the sign and the size
of errors. With regard to the sign of an error, for instance,
the PRmetric could have three values (High, Low, None;
see Table 1). Assuming that the SIG attributed the value
Low for a certain vulnerability, if a participant selects High
the error is an overestimation (positive error, +1), if he or
she selects None it is an underestimation (negative error, -
1). Errors may also have different sizes, which depend on
the specific metric and the specific SIG evaluation. In the
previous example, the size of the error is at most 1. However,
for a different vulnerability the SIG could have evaluated
as High for the PR metric. In that case, if a participant
selects Low it results in a negative error of size 1 (i.e., -
1), if he/she selects None the error size is 2 (i.e., -2), with
different consequences on the overall scoring error for the
vulnerability.
Given this computation of errors’ sign and size, we
observe that the frequency of large errors (defined as errors
with size greater then 1), is small. This indicates that, in
general, subjects did not ‘reverse’ the evaluation by com-
pletely missing the correct answer (e.g. assessing a High
Confidentiality impact as a None), a situation that might
have lead to a severely mistaken vulnerability assessment.
Whereas a detailed analysis of error margins is outside
of the scope of this study we observe that, overall, most
subjects in all groups showed a good grasp of the task at
hand.
The large errors we observe on certain metrics (between
30% and 60% of tests, depending on the group of respon-
dents and the metric, as discussed in the following) are
mostly produced by errors of size 1. Error rates of this size
are to be expected in similar experimental circumstances [34,
finds error in the 30-40% rate over a binomial outcome],
particularly considering that participants in our experiment
have been explicitly selected with no previous experience in
CVSS assessment, the limited amount of time, and the CVE
description as the only technical documentation, this rate of
small errors is unsurprising.
Overall, we observe that there is a clear difference in
accuracy between the security unskilled CS and security
skilled SEC+PRO for all metrics. This is particularly evident
in the AV, AC and PR metrics, and all CIA impact metrics.
This effect is also present in the UI metric, but here the CS
and SEC students perform similarly, whereas professionals
in the PRO group achieve higher accuracy. We observe an
overall tendency in over-estimating PR and UI, and under-
estimating AC, which may indicate that relevant information
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information, and Cryptographic issues.
Fig. 1. Distribution of difference in severity estimation by vulnerability type and subject group.
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error = 0 indicates accordance. error < 0 indicates that subjects under-estimated that metric’s assessment.
error > 0 indicates that subjects over-estimated it. SEC and PRO subjects are consistently more precise than
CS in assessing vulnerability impact.
Fig. 2. Distribution of assessment errors over the CVSS metrics.
for the assessment of these metrics are missing, a sensible
problem already noted in the industrial sector as well (see
for example the recent ‘call for action’ from NIST [31]).
Conversely, the difference between SEC students and PRO
professionals seems less pronounced, if present at all. The
tendency of the error does not appear to meaningfully differ
between groups, indicating no specific bias toward over or
underestimation.
Table 5 reports quantitatively the comparison depicted
in Fig. 2. As error sign does not present obvious between-
group differences, for the sake of conciseness here we
only consider differences in absolute error rates. At a first
approximation, we evaluate significant differences between
the groups by employing an unpaired Wilcoxon rank sum
test,4 and test the alternative hypothesis that error size
follows the intuition that e(ai∈PRO(vj)) < e(ai∈SEC(vj)) <
e(ai∈CS(vj)), ∀j ∈ {AV, AC, UI, PR, C, I, A}. The statistical
significance level is calculated using a Holm-Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons. From the results it
is apparent that subjects with security knowledge (i.e.,
SEC+PRO) are significantly more accurate than subjects with
no security knowledge (i.e., CS) on all metrics. Interestingly,
4. This assumes independency between observations. This is violated
in our data as the same subject is observed multiple times. Whereas
this is formally incorrect, here it only serves the illustrative purpose of
quantifying results in Fig. 2. A formal analysis follows in this Section.
TABLE 5
Preliminary comparison of group accuracy by CVSS metric.
(1) CS (2) SEC (3) PRO Signif.
err sd err sd err sd 1v2 2v3
AV 0.67 0.91 0.56 0.86 0.54 0.87 *
AC 0.47 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 **
UI 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.28 0.45 **
PR 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.56
C 0.72 0.70 0.48 0.66 0.48 0.67 **
I 0.68 0.67 0.47 0.66 0.45 0.61 **
A 0.82 0.77 0.51 0.70 0.51 0.73 **
Significance is Holm-Bonferroni corrected and is indicated as: ∗∗
for p < 0.01 and ∗ for p < 0.05 for a Wilcox rank sum test. A
more formal evaluation accounting for within-subject dependency
of observation is provided in Table 6.
we find that over all metrics (with the exception of UI
as discussed above), the PRO group does not appear to
perform significantly better than the SEC group. Whereas
we can not say that the two groups perform equally, it is
suggestive to notice that the computed error rates and stan-
dard deviations for the two groups indicate a substantial
overlap between the two distributions. As discussed in the
following, this result should not be considered completely
surprising or counterintuitive, rather an interesting con-
8vergence with similar experiments performed in different
contexts and settings seems to arise, pointing to possible
common characteristics of a class of problems.
As each metric has a different set of possible values,
to simplify the interpretation of results, we here consider
the binary response of presence or absence of error in the
assessment. We define a set of regression equations for each
CVSS metric j of the form:
g(ejvi) = c+ β1CONFvi + β2GROUP i (2)
+ β3V ULNTY PEv + ..
where g(·) is the logit link function, ejvi is the binary
response on presence or absence of error on metric j
for subject i and vulnerability v, and β2GROUP i and
β3V ULNTY PEv represent respectively the vector of
subject groups (CS, SEC, PRO), and vulnerability categories.5
Table 6 reports the regressions’ results. We conserva-
tively consider assessments with an ‘Unsure’ level of con-
fidence (ref. Tab. 4) as non-confident. Effects for the group
variables SEC and PRO are with respect to the baseline
category CS. We report the estimated change in odds of error
and confidence intervals of the estimation.
From the results it appears that subjects with security
knowledge, i.e. SEC+PRO, are significantly more accurate at the
assessment than subjects with no security knowledge, i.e. CS, on
all metrics. Overall, SEC+PRO is between 30% to 60% less
likely than CS in making an error. Interestingly, we find that
the PRO group does not appear to perform significantly better than
the SEC group (with the exception of UI metric, as reported
in Fig. 2, for which PRO is approximately 60% less likely to err
than SEC subjects). A borderline result is found for the AV
and PR metrics, where the C.I. for SEC is only marginally
crossing 1. This may indicate that the professional exper-
tise that characterizes the PRO group does not necessarily
improve the accuracy of the assessment over subjects with
security knowledge but limited or no professional expertise.
The effect of confidence on the assessment is relevant for the
impact metrics CIA, indicating that a significant source of
uncertainty may emerge from the effect of the vulnerability
on the system. Interestingly, we find that some vulnerability
types (Information and Resource access) are likely to
induce error on the A metric, suggesting that specific knowl-
edge or expertise may be needed to discern, for example,
between information and service availability.
Variance by subject (V ar(c|ID)) and by vulnerability
(V ar(c|CV E)) indicate that the intercept of the model may
vary significantly for each observation (i.e. both different
subjects and vulnerabilities have different ‘baseline’ error
rates). This is interesting in itself as it indicates that nei-
ther the subject variables (GROUP i) nor the vulnera-
bility variables (V ULNTY PEv), whereas significant in
explaining part of the observed error, may fully characterize
the effect. For example, specific user characteristics or the
thoroughness of the vulnerability description may play a
substantial role in determining assessment accuracy. On
5. We did consider interaction effects between explanatory variables
in the preliminary phases of this analysis, and found qualitatively
equivalent results. To avoid complicating the notation and the result
interpretation, we do not report those here.
this same line, it is interesting to observe that the overall
explicative power of the model is relatively small for all
the considered metrics. This can be expected for random
processes in natural experiments where the environment
can not be fully controlled by the experimenter [4] (as
exemplified by the variance explained by the full model
as opposed to that of the fixed effects); still, the small R2
values for the fixed effect parameters suggest that the sole
presence of security knowledge, even when confounded
by assessment confidence and vulnerability type, does not
satisfactorily characterize the observation. This further sup-
ports that other subject-specific characteristics may drive the
occurrence of an error. We investigate this in the following.
4.2 Effect of subject characteristics
To analyze results in finer detail, we use the answers
from the questionnaire that characterizes PRO subjects as
described in Sec. 3.5. This allows us to avoid possible bias in
self-reporting by students and to focus on the target group
of the professionals that eventually perform the analysis in
the real world [37].
The median subject in the PRO group has six years
of professional expertise in the security field, in a range
between one and fifteen years (µ = 5.79, σ = 3.83). Figure 3
reports the distribution of the levels for each measured vari-
able. All factors are reported on an ordinal scale (with the
exception of CVSS experience for which we have a nominal
scale), codified in levels 1 → 3, where Education: 1=High
School; 2=BSc degree; 3=MSc degree. Previous CVSS experi-
ence: 1=None; 2=Yes; 3=NON-CVSS metric. System security
→ Attacks: 1=Novice; 2=Knowledgeable; 3=Expert (a fourth
level, ‘None’, is not reported as no participant rated him or
herself less than novice on any of these dimensions). Most
subjects obtained at least a BSc degree. From discussion
during the initial CVSS training it emerged that none of the
participants in the PRO group had a formal specialization
in security at the University level. The group is evenly
split between participants that have previous experience
in vulnerability measurement (earlier versions of the CVSS
or other methods); most participants rated themselves as
‘Competent’ or ‘Expert’ in Network Security, and are equally
split between the levels ‘Novice’ and ‘Competent or Expert’
for all other variables.
To evaluate the effect of subject characteristics on odds
of error we first make two considerations: first, the subject
distribution seem to be skewed toward presence or absence
of expertise or education rather than being meaningfully
distributed across all levels. For example, most subjects
attended University with only a handful interrupting their
studies after high school; similarly, few subjects rated them-
selves as ‘experts’ in any dimension, with most subjects
being either ‘novices’ or ‘competent’ on the subject matter.
We therefore collapse the levels to ‘novice’ or ‘not novice’
to represent this distinction. Second, some subject charac-
teristics may show high levels of correlation: for example,
subjects competent in system security may be likely compe-
tent on network security as well. Similarly, highly educated
professionals may be (negatively) correlated with years of
experience (as more time would be spent on one’s studies
than on the profession). We check for multicollinearity prob-
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Effect of security education on odds of error
Regression on odds of error accounting for presence or absence of security knowledge and professional security expertise. SEC+PRO are
significantly more accurate than CS in the assessment. SEC does not perform significantly better than CS in the UI metric, whereas PRO
does. Marginal results are obtained for AV and PR.
error AV AC UI PR C I A
c 0.34 1.11 3.26 3.16∗ 1.01 1.48 0.61
[0.11; 1.01] [0.57; 2.14] [0.91; 11.75] [1.06; 9.52] [0.38; 2.68] [0.60; 3.66] [0.22; 1.72]
SEC 0.70 0.58∗ 1.05 0.75 0.41∗ 0.46∗ 0.36∗
[0.47; 1.04] [0.38; 0.87] [0.72; 1.53] [0.55; 1.04] [0.26; 0.64] [0.32; 0.67] [0.25; 0.52]
PRO 0.58∗ 0.59∗ 0.36∗ 0.72∗ 0.39∗ 0.47∗ 0.34∗
[0.39; 0.87] [0.39; 0.89] [0.25; 0.53] [0.52; 0.99] [0.25; 0.61] [0.32; 0.68] [0.23; 0.49]
Conf. 0.86 1.00 0.84 1.01 0.71∗ 0.64∗ 0.79
[0.65; 1.11] [0.78; 1.27] [0.64; 1.10] [0.79; 1.28] [0.55; 0.92] [0.50; 0.82] [0.61; 1.01]
Vulnerability variables
Cryptographic Issues 0.43 1.48 0.36 0.17 1.38 1.20 3.74
[0.06; 2.90] [0.51; 4.32] [0.04; 3.19] [0.03; 1.09] [0.27; 7.08] [0.27; 5.43] [0.64; 21.83]
Information 2.15 1.20 0.19 0.46 2.82 1.53 4.58
[0.42; 11.21] [0.47; 3.09] [0.03; 1.29] [0.09; 2.47] [0.66; 12.00] [0.40; 5.78] [0.97; 21.87]
Input 2.69 0.67 0.23∗ 0.50 1.59 0.88 2.91
[0.79; 9.24] [0.33; 1.35] [0.05; 0.94] [0.15; 1.72] [0.54; 4.66] [0.32; 2.36] [0.92; 9.38]
Resource Access 0.76 0.88 0.18 0.19∗ 2.22 1.21 4.87∗
[0.16; 3.55] [0.37; 2.11] [0.03; 1.04] [0.04; 0.87] [0.58; 8.54] [0.35; 4.06] [1.15; 20.76]
Other 2.21 0.48 0.08∗ 0.51 1.68 1.12 4.35
[0.42; 11.82] [0.19; 1.20] [0.01; 0.53] [0.10; 2.65] [0.39; 7.13] [0.29; 4.25] [0.92; 20.97]
V ar(c|ID) 0.25 0.33 0.19 0.93 0.38 0.22 0.20
V ar(c|CV E) 1.04 0.30 1.42 0.64 0.79 0.66 0.92
PseudoR2 (fixed eff.) 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.11
PseudoR2 (full mod.) 0.34 0.19 0.41 0.41 0.31 0.26 0.34
N 1924 1924 1924 1924 1924 1924 1924
Education Prev. CVSS exp. Sys. Sec. Net. Sec. Crypto Attacks
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
0
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All factors but CVSS exp. (nominal) are on an ordinal scale. Reference levels: Education: 1=High School; 2=BSc
degree; 3=MSc degree. Previous CVSS experience: 1=None; 2=Yes; 3=NON-CVSS metric. System security →
Attacks: 1=Novice; 2=Knowledgeable; 3=Expert.
Fig. 3. Education and expertise profile of professionals in the PRO group.
lems by calculating the Variance Inflation Factor of the cate-
gorical variables defined above, and drop the variables that
show evidence of correlation; we keep: years, attacks,
system security. We then define the following regres-
sion equation:
g(ejvi) = c+ β1Y earsi + β2Attacksi + β3SysSec (3)
+ βV ULNTY PEv + ..
Table 7 reports the results. In general, we observe that
not all expertise dimensions are relevant for all evaluation
metrics. This is to be expected as, for example, knowledge
of in attack techniques may have an impact on evaluating
complexity of attack, but may make little difference on
other more system-oriented aspects like requirements on
user interaction. More in detail, we find that Attack expertise
dramatically decreases error over the AV and AC metrics by
almost 60%. Years of experience increases accuracy over the
UI and PR metrics (by roughly 20% per year), explaining the
mismatch on UI between SEC and PRO subjects identified in
Fig. 2. System security knowledge appears to have a positive
impact on the accuracy of assessments on the C and A
metrics, but we do not consider this effect to be highly
significant. Results for vulnerability type are qualitatively
equivalent to those reported for the evaluation by group
in Tab. 6. Interestingly, the overall explanatory power of
the model (accounting for both fixed and random effects)
remains satisfactory, and the subject characteristics are clearly
effective in explaining the variance for most metrics. The only
low (< 10%)R2 fixed-effect values is for AV and can be
explained by the low incidence of error in this metric, which
may be then simply be driven by random fluctuations. This
is in contrast with the effect for, for example, the AC metric
that is characterized by a high variability in error (ref. Fig. 2),
and for which more than 20% of the variance is explained
by the measured fixed effects. This is in sharp contrast with
results in Tab. 6 where most of the variance was absorbed
by the random effects.
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TABLE 7
Effect of subject characteristics on odds of error in the PRO group
Regression on odds of error by subject characteristics and vulnerability category. Education, CVSSExp, NetSec, Crypto have been dropped
because highly correlated with other factors in the regression; this is to avoid multicollinearity problems. Overall we find that different
vulnerability aspects are covered by different subject characteristics.
error AV AC UI PR C I A
c 0.79 2.70 3.42 59.80∗ 2.22 3.81 0.37
[0.14; 4.36] [0.56; 13.54] [0.83; 14.79] [1.83; 3027.71] [0.35; 14.13] [0.43; 34.31] [0.04; 2.87]
Years 0.96 0.95 0.86∗ 0.80∗ 0.86 0.86 0.90
[0.84; 1.09] [0.81; 1.11] [0.76; 0.97] [0.64; 0.99] [0.71; 1.05] [0.68; 1.10] [0.74; 1.11]
Attacks 0.49∗ 0.42∗ 1.32 0.66 0.45 0.41 0.61
[0.26; 0.89] [0.19; 0.85] [0.77; 2.25] [0.24; 1.77] [0.18; 1.10] [0.13; 1.23] [0.23; 1.53]
SystemSec 1.14 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.48 0.43 0.42
[0.62; 2.14] [0.35; 1.54] [0.44; 1.33] [0.27; 2.03] [0.19; 1.20] [0.13; 1.35] [0.15; 1.07]
Vulnerability variables
Cryp. Issues 0.24 4.67 0.24 0.01 1.20 1.21 6.29
[0.01; 3.53] [0.65; 42.22] [0.03; 1.79] [0.00; 1.81] [0.16; 9.43] [0.15; 10.07] [0.59; 76.88]
Information 2.13 1.03 0.14∗ 0.02 1.77 3.05 13.13∗
[0.23; 20.43] [0.19; 5.63] [0.02; 0.83] [0.00; 2.33] [0.30; 10.92] [0.49; 21.10] [1.64; 124.53]
Input 0.81 0.21∗ 0.17∗ 0.20 1.08 0.59 4.07
[0.15; 4.32] [0.05; 0.72] [0.04; 0.62] [0.00; 8.24] [0.28; 4.26] [0.15; 2.40] [0.82; 23.81]
Resource Access 0.42 0.62 0.26 0.02 2.25 1.01 15.37∗
[0.05; 3.51] [0.13; 3.00] [0.05; 1.34] [0.00; 1.91] [0.42; 12.57] [0.18; 5.76] [2.20; 131.91]
Other 1.19 0.12∗ 0.12∗ 0.23 1.14 0.62 6.13
[0.11; 12.64] [0.02; 0.74] [0.02; 0.73] [0.00; 37.62] [0.19; 7.10] [0.09; 4.04] [0.73; 57.79]
V ar(c|ID) 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.51 0.32 0.60 0.34
V ar(c|CV E) 1.59 0.74 0.83 1.58 0.83 0.90 1.19
PseudoR2 (fixed eff.) 0.07 0.22 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.16
PseudoR2 (full model) 0.38 0.39 0.30 0.47 0.33 0.41 0.43
N 357 357 357 357 357 357 357
5 DISCUSSION
Economics of technical education and of professional
experience. The value of professional experience and of
technical education could be measured by the remunera-
tions offered to IT professionals and through the cost of
achieving a degree in security-oriented courses or the cost
for an advanced professional training program. Therefore,
to know that information security knowledge significantly
affects the accuracy of a security assessment brings no sur-
prise. However, what is almost never measured, and might
have important implications in investments for building a
competent workforce, is the width of the gain. In other
words, the economics of technical education and profes-
sional experience is seldom analytically investigated, more
often is left to anecdotes or to political discourses.
With our study we have attempted a quantitative esti-
mate of the benefit brought by knowledge. On average, it
appears remarkable: those with security knowledge (SEC
and PRO groups) show error rates reduced by approximately
20% (see Fig. 2). A second result appears by looking at
the average confidence declared by participants: not just
assessment accuracy improves with knowledge, but also
confidence in assessments. In fact, the unskilled students
CS are mostly not confident, while the skilled participants
SEC+PRO declare higher confidence. Improving confidence
in one’s own work is as valuable as improving the accuracy,
because it leads to a better self-evaluation, a better control
of the task at hand, and optimizes time and efforts.
Implications for recruiting and training security pro-
fessionals. What we have seen in our tests is that the combi-
nation of skills explains most of the subjects’ variance. This
is another observation often made anecdotally, but seldom
analytically tested in order to be translated into operational
policies and tools useful in the definition of recruiting plans
or training investments. Moreover, competences in different
technical domains are correlated. For example, expertise in
system security/hardening is highly correlated with exper-
tise in network security; similarly, experience with previous
vulnerability assessments and attack expertise go hand in
hand. What emerges from our study is that professionals
with same specialization, i.e., cybersecurity, exhibits differ-
ent competence profiles defined by correlated skills, and
different performance in assessing different security metrics
are correlated with different profiles. This means that often
the specification ”security professional with x years of ex-
perience”, or even a professional qualification like ”Security
Architect” and the like, could be a too coarse classification
to be useful for finding a good match with a security task,
especially when the task is mostly oriented to problem
solving.
More specific and detailed studies about how specific
technical skills correlate and influence problem solving abil-
ities should be useful to inform recruiting and training in-
vestments. Recruiting should better know whether specific
specialist skills are needed or technical problem solving abil-
ities are required. This should be considered at fine-grained
level, by analyzing skills correlation and complementarity.
The same holds for professional training, today often unable
to be tailored for a clear outcome when a problem solver
profile is needed.
Studying socio-technical issues by testing students.
One clear result from our study is that students with se-
curity training and security professionals could perform
similarly for some class of problems and under specific
conditions. Beside observations related to the economics
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of technical education and of professional experience, the
result is suggesting us another possibility: if we are able
to control the conditions leading to similar performance
between students and professionals, then for all practical
scenarios in which those conditions are realistic, we could
reliably study the socio-technical phenomena by testing
students, typically easy to enroll in scientific studies, rather
than professionals, notoriously very difficult to recruit for
experiments.
In general, it seems that similar performance between
students and professionals emerges when professionals are
unable to address the problem by reusing past mental
models or patterns of solution. It also seems to emerge
for problems characterized by subjective interpretations and
uncertainty about the consequences of an individual evalu-
ation, whereas it disappears in situations where the amount
of specialist technical skills or practice gained in years of
experience is the only important factor.
We have already encountered such a situation in the soft-
ware engineering literature. In [21], the authors explicitly
tested whether CS students could be employed in place of
professional programmers for assessing the project’s lead
time. Similar to our scenario, to perform the assessment, it
is required to evaluate subjective data and the importance
of contributing factors is uncertain. The study found no
significant difference between students and professionals.
In [37], again, the quality of programming between students
and professionals has been tested. The results were that
professionals perform significantly better when they could
adopt a familiar development approach, but the equivalence
between professionals and students returns when an un-
familiar development approach was tested. This effect of
experience was also confirmed by cognitive studies [23].
Our work add a new scenario regarding information
security and problem solving skills. Further experiments
could shed more light on the specific conditions that may
lead to a substantial equivalence in tests between students
with certain knowledge and professionals with given pro-
files. This would contribute to develop a relevant body of
knowledge about the preconditions for defining suitable
natural experiments for specific technical aspects, like cy-
bersecurity, without necessarily recruit the scarce and hardly
available professionals.
Uncertainty in problem statement affects differently
the different groups. Another result that consistently
emerges from the analysis is that the assessment accuracy
may vary significantly among vulnerabilities for all three
groups of participants. In the Appendix, specific details
and examples are provided. In general, this represents a
confirmation of the bias possibly introduced by framing the
security problem. Uncertainty, e.g. produced by an equiv-
ocal problem description, might introduce a random error,
which may penalize either the experts or the non-experts.
This suggests that follow-up studies may more formally
consider the bias introduced by ambiguous vulnerability
descriptions on the assessment accuracy and, in general,
on problem solving when security threats are affected by
uncertainty.
6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
We here identify and discuss the limitations of our study.
We consider Internal and External threats to validity [48].
Internal. Subjects in all groups were given an introduc-
tory lecture on vulnerability assessment and scoring with
CVSS prior to the exercise. The exercise was conducted in
class by the same lecturer, using the same material. Another
factor that may influence subjects’ assessments is the learn-
ing factor: “early assessments” might be less precise than
“late assessments”. All subjects performed the assessment
following a fixed vulnerability order. We address possible
biases in the methodology by considering the within ob-
servation variance on the single vulnerabilities [4]. Further,
the use of students as subjects of an experiment can be
controversial, especially when the matter of the study is di-
rectly related to a course that the students are attending[10].
Following the guidelines given in [42], [10] we made clear
to all students that the exercise is not part of their final
evaluation, and that their assessments do not influence their
grades or student career.
External. A software engineer investigating a vulnerabil-
ity in a real scenario can account for additional information
beside the vulnerability description when performing the
analysis. This additional information was not provided in
the context of our experiment. For this reason we consider
our accuracy estimates as conservative (worst-case). Ac-
counting for professionals directly addresses this concern
and confirms previous studies on the representativeness
of students in software engineering experiments [37]. On
the other hand, the limited number of participants in the
SEC and PRO groups, and the difficulty associated with
recruiting large sets of professionals [37] calls for further
studies on the subject.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this study we evaluated the effect of security knowledge
and expertise on security vulnerability assessment. Whereas
the case study is specific to the application of CVSS, it
nevertheless provides a useful framework that formalizes
adversarial, system, and user perspectives in an assessment,
and therefore well captures the overall skill set on which
security practice is built. An important lesson learned with
this work is that recurrent effects of expertise and education
with respect to some classes of problems described in previ-
ous studies unrelated with security, emerge also with an im-
portant security task like the vulnerability assessment. Our
hypothesis is that the task we have tested in our experiment
exhibits some general characteristics common with similar
tasks studied, for example, in software engineering contexts.
This seems interesting to us since it suggests that possi-
ble fruitful approaches to some security problems could
be derived from experience in different fields or applying
methods and analyses not specifically produced within the
security field.
Whereas it is not our goal to provide the ultimate guide-
lines for improving the shortage of well-trained security
professionals, some useful lessons might be learned from
our study. One is to avoid inflexible assumptions regarding
the prevalence of experience over education or adversarial
thinking over principles and abstractions. What we have
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seen is that the ability to face to complex security prob-
lems cannot be explained by coarse-grained categories or
single characteristics and skill. What matters is always a
combination of skills and experience of the assessor and
the specifics of the problem to be evaluated. Another lesson
learned is that experience may replace formal education, but
likewise specific training may provide abilities similar to
those brought by experience. Therefore, for both academic
education and professional training, the ability to face com-
plex security problems mostly depends on a well-balanced
skill set in breadth and depth of knowledge, combined with
practical experience.
Future work will replicate this analysis with the final
CVSS language [15], and include the Scope metric as well.
We are particularly interested in cooperating with other
researchers to replicate our study in different national and
educational contest as results might have important policy
implication for university education in cybersecurity and
eventually for cybersecurity in the field.
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APPENDIX
Here we discuss the assessment results for three vulnerabili-
ties as examples of the way participants with different skills
and experiences have interpreted uncertain information (see
Figure 4 and the following discussion of the three examples).
Finally, Figure 5 reports error rates for all vulnerabilities of
the assessment. Figure 4 reports the assessment accuracy
(expressed in terms of number of errors) for three vulnera-
bilities that represent typical outcomes: (i) the three groups
perform similarly; (ii) SEC+PRO have a clear advantage over
CS; (iii) we obtain mixed results over different metrics.
• Similar accuracy over all metrics (CVE-2014-2005).
Sophos Disk Encryption (SDE) 5.x in Sophos En-
terprise Console (SEC) 5.x before 5.2.2 does not
enforce intended authentication requirements for
a resume action from sleep mode, which allows
physically proximate attackers to obtain desktop
access by leveraging the absence of a login screen.
From this description, it is clear that the attacker needs to
be physically proximate to the target system, which gives an
obvious clue for AV; similarly, all groups showed low error
rates over the CIA assessment, as it is clear that the attacker
gets full (user) access to the system by impersonating the
legitimate user. Whereas almost all SEC and PRO subjects
understood that the attacker need not be logged in ahead
of the attack and scored PR correctly, CS students were
likely confused by the existence of an authentication mech-
anism for the attacker to bypass. This suggests that well-
formalized security tasks may be accomplished comparably
well by security experts and general IT experts.
• Clear effect of security knowledge (CVE-2009-1136).
The Microsoft Office Web Components Spread-
sheet ActiveX control (aka OWC10 or OWC11), as
distributed in Office XP SP3 and Office 2003 SP3,
Office XP Web Components SP3, Office 2003 Web
Components SP3, Office 2003 Web Components
SP1 for the 2007 Microsoft Office System, Internet
Security and Acceleration (ISA) Server 2004 SP3
and 2006 Gold and SP1, and Office Small Busi-
ness Accounting 2006, when used in Internet Ex-
plorer, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary
code via a crafted call to the msDataSourceObject
method, as exploited in the wild in July and August
2009, aka ”Office Web Components HTML Script
Vulnerability.”
Whereas all groups correctly understood that the attack
can happen remotely (AV), the security knowledge of SEC
and PRO has a clear effect on the CIA metrics. For this
vulnerability, students in both the SEC and CS groups were
likely confused by the long list of vulnerable systems, giving
the impression that these are specific vulnerable software
configurations (a criteria for AC:H [15]), as opposed to a
mere list of vulnerable software. PRO subjects did not get
confused by this. In this vulnerability the PRO advantage
on the UI metric, discussed in the analysis, is apparent:
PRO subjects are the only one that consistently understood
that the attack process requires a user to load a webpage
that will then load the vulnerable method. This may be
easier for PRO subjects to grasp because of the typical attack
dynamics of phishing or XSS attacks commonly received by
organizations.
• Mixed results (CVE-2009-3873).
The JPEG Image Writer in Sun Java SE in JDK
and JRE 5.0 before Update 22, JDK and JRE 6
before Update 17, and SDK and JRE 1.4.x before
1.4.2 24 allows remote attackers to gain privileges
via a crafted image file, related to a ”quantization
problem,” aka Bug Id 6862968.
The high error for SEC and CS students is likely caused
by the misleading “remote attackers” reference in the descrip-
tion: the vulnerability requires the component to load an
image file locally (irrespective of whether this is provided
from remote), and qualifies for an AV:L assessment (see
also [15, Sec. 3.3 of the User guide]). PRO subjects did
not get tricked by the misleading wording. Again, PRO
subjects outperformed both student groups in the UI metric,
understanding that the file need be loaded by the user
(e.g. through interaction in a web browser). Interestingly,
all groups have a high degree of error in the CIA metrics,
suggesting that they deemed “gain privileges” as a moderate
impact, whereas in most environments Java’s JDK/JRE will
be running with already high privileges, hence giving the
attacker full access.
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Fraction of erroneous assessments by group for three CVEs. Higher on the scale corresponds to higher error
(lower is better). The vertical bars report the standard errors. For the first vulnerability, CVE-2014-2005, the
three groups perform similarly over all metrics. In the second, CVE-2009-1136, security knowledge gives a
clear advantage on assessment accuracy, particularly in the CIA impact metrics. Lastly, for CVE-2009-3873
we observed mixed results, where security expertise appear to help for PR, CIA, but not for AV and AC, with
SEC performing worse than CS and PRO on the UI metric.
Fig. 4. Example of assessment error rates by group on three CVEs
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Fig. 5. Error rates for CS, SEC, and PRO by vulnerability and CVSS metrics
